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TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS: WHAT IS THEIR CHARITABLE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND HOW SHOULD IT BE DEFINED AND 
REPORTED? 
NANCY M. KANE, DBA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In ancient Greece, taking money in exchange for providing life-saving 
services was grounds for electrocution by the gods.  When Zeus was informed 
that Asclepius, the founder of medicine, was “bribed with gold” to bring the 
dead back to life, Zeus struck him dead with a thunderbolt.1  The ancient 
tension between being a healer and getting paid to heal continues today in 
modern America.  Now it is not an issue of whether healers should be paid, but 
rather, how much is paid, how the fee is collected, and whether or not the 
healers properly report their activities to the public.  In Zeus’ place are many 
public officials, from federal and state lawmakers and enforcers to the I.R.S. 
and county tax authorities, all deeply concerned about whether nonprofit, tax-
exempt hospitals deserve their tax-exemptions. 
II.  THE GATHERING STORM 
In 2003, a series of articles in The Wall Street Journal detailed aggressive 
billing and debt collection practices of a number of highly respected nonprofit 
hospitals, marking the beginning of an upsurge in public attention to the 
charitable behavior of hospitals.2  Class action lawsuits about unfair billing and 
collection practices and inadequate provision of charity care were filed in 2004 
against hundreds of hospitals nationwide, spearheaded by Richard Scruggs, a 
lawyer who helped the states win huge settlements from the tobacco industry 
in the 1990s.  In 2005, two powerful members of Congress, Representative Bill 
Thomas (California), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and 
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 1. ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 175 (Penguin Books 1964); see Ron Leadbetter, 
Asclepius, Enclyopedia Mythica, http://www.pantheon.org/articles/a/asclepius.html (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007). 
 2. See Lucette Lagnado, Full Price: A Young Woman, an Appendectomy, and a $19,000 
Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A1; Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still Paying: 
Jeanette White Is Long Dead But Her Hospital Bill Lives On, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at B1. 
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Senator Charles E. Grassley (Iowa), Chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee, began publicly questioning the value of hospital tax-exemption 
compared to the benefit the community received from them.  According to 
Grassley, “Too many [hospitals] do little to nothing.  Too often, it seems that 
tax-exempt hospitals offer less charitable care and community benefit than for-
profit hospitals.”3  Grassley has also expressed concern about hospital 
executive compensation levels, joint ventures with commercial organizations, 
and hospital for-profit subsidiaries.4  Thomas explained, “Congress has a 
responsibility to assure the American taxpayer that the tax-exempt hospital 
sector is living up to its community responsibilities.”5 
Meanwhile, for 2006, the I.R.S. announced a stronger enforcement 
presence for nonprofit hospitals, citing concern over hospital practices in the 
areas of executive compensation, community benefit accountability, and the 
use of the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds.6  As part of that effort, they sent out 
nearly six hundred “compliance check” letters to nonprofit hospitals requesting 
answers to eighty detailed questions.7 
Between 2004 and 2006, state and local officials have also stepped up their 
challenges of hospital charitable behavior and tax-exempt status.  From New 
Hampshire to Utah, state legislators and attorneys general have been actively 
questioning the appropriateness of billing and collection practices, while 
challenging tax-exemption requests for hospital-acquired property and 
businesses that were previously tax-paying.  In New Hampshire, the legislature 
set up a committee to study hospital property tax exemptions.8  After a year of 
work, the committee cited continuing interest but offered no concrete proposals 
other than that hospitals should be required to report their financial statements 
to the public.9  In Ohio, the Ohio Tax Commissioner denied a local tax 
exemption for Cleveland Clinic’s newly acquired clinic in a wealthy suburb 
because it provided minimal charity care.10  In Illinois, the state passed 
legislation requiring community benefit reporting in 2003; in 2006, the state 
 
 3. Robert Pear, I.R.S. Checking Compliance by Tax-Exempt Hospitals: Inquiry May Bring 
Changes in Standards, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at A15. 
 4. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, to 
Richard J. Davidson, President, American Hospital Association (Mar. 8, 2006), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg030806aha.pdf. 
 5. Luiza Ch. Savage, Senator Eyes City Hospital in Tax Debate, N.Y. SUN, May 26, 2005, 
at A1. 
 6. David M. Flynn & Philip H. Lebowitz, 2006 Exempt Organizations (EO) Implementing 
Guidelines (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.mondaq.com. 
 7. Pear, supra note 3. 
 8. Roger Talbot, State Eyes Hospitals’ Tax-Exempt Status, UNION LEADER (Manchester, 
N.H.), Dec. 18, 2005, at A12. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Sarah Treffinger, Ruling Presents New Challenge to Hospitals’ Tax-Exempt Status, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 27, 2005, at B6. 
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Attorney General proposed legislation (H.B. 5000) requiring minimum charity 
expenditures by nonprofit hospitals.11  In North Carolina, a bill was proposed 
that would limit the types of property that can be exempt and would require 
provision of a minimum level of charity care expenditure.12  In Kansas, the 
Attorney General opened an investigation of hospital billing and collection 
practices.13  In Utah, Intermountain Health agreed to less aggressive debt 
collection practices under pressure from the legislature.14  In Minnesota, the 
Attorney General investigated aggressive debt collection and inadequate 
provision of charity care, forcing four hospital systems to agree to discount 
charges to the uninsured by 40 to 60%.15  In 2005, eight states proposed bills 
regarding the provision of charity care and billing practices.16  While little has 
actually passed into law, it may be just a matter of time before a higher 
standard of charitable behavior will be established by certain states, and the 
federal government is likely to pass a bill in the near future.17  Representative 
Bill Thomas proposed the Tax Exempt Hospitals Responsibility Act of 2006, 
which would impose penalties on nonprofit hospitals failing to provide a 
minimum level of charity care, among other things.18 
III.  MAJOR THEMES TO RECENT TAX-EXEMPT CHALLENGES 
The issues involved in state and federal challenges to hospital tax-
exemption are much broader than simply how much charity care hospitals 
provide.  They include excessive pricing, excessive personal gain, 
demonstrable value for the value of tax exemption, transparency, and 
accountability.  This range of issues gives the political forces challenging 
nonprofit hospitals access to a more powerful spectrum of stakeholders than 
just advocates for the uninsured.  It creates odd bedfellows coupling politically 
conservative advocates of health savings accounts (HSAs) with liberal 
consumer advocacy groups concerned about vulnerable populations of 
uninsured Americans.  Local towns and school districts starving for tax 
revenue are leading the charge in some states.  One sign of the widening 
political appeal of the issue was a recent 60 Minutes segment that was critical 
 
 11. Editorial, Charity Standard, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2006, at A49. 
 12. Hamilton C. Horton, Jr., Re-Examine Tax-Exempt Status for Hospitals, WINSTON-
SALEM J., June 11, 2005, at A11. 
 13. Robert Pear, Nonprofit Hospitals Face Scrutiny Over Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2006, at 18. 
 14. Brian Baskin, Fixing Charity Issues Seems Somebody Else’s Problem, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, July 3, 2005. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Reform of Law on Tax-Exempts Inevitable, But Impact on Hospitals Seen Uncertain, 16 
BNA’S MEDICARE REP. 1296 (2005). 
 18. H.R. 6420, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006). 
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of hospitals’ charitable behavior.19  A deeper understanding of the hospital 
behaviors generating the political momentum clarifies why policy change is 
likely and why the momentum is not tied to hospital provision of charity care 
alone. 
A. Excessive Pricing 
Excessive pricing itself is multifaceted, with each facet bringing in a new 
set of political interests.  The most obvious group subject to excessive pricing 
are the uninsured, who are routinely charged prices that are between two to six 
times the cost to produce the service.  They are then aggressively pursued by 
debt collection agencies for years. 
While charges that bear little resemblance to cost may have had relatively 
benign motivations twenty-five years ago,20 they have become highly visible 
symbols of nonprofit hospital “corporate” behavior toward the defenseless 
consumer.  Average collection rates on these inflated bills run roughly 20% of 
the cost (not charges) of care,21 which implies that only pennies on the dollar 
amounts billed are actually collected.  Yet some nonprofit hospitals pursue 
former patients to extremes including putting liens on homes, garnishing 
wages, and even imprisoning debtors.22  Intended or not, aggressive debt 
collection practices discourage patients with medical debt from returning for 
additional care. 
The impact on people owing the bills, regardless of whether they pay, can 
be disastrous.  People with high medical indebtedness (whether insured or not) 
are less likely than others to seek appropriate medical care when needed and 
will curtail activities that might result in injuries, such as participation in 
sports.23  Many people with medically-related debt file for personal 
bankruptcy.  These vulnerable people constitute the working poor and the 
middle class, a large segment of U.S. society. 
A very different constituency concerned about excessively high hospital 
prices are  commercial health insurers, backed by conservative policymakers 
who believe that high-deductible health plans (HDHPs), coupled with tax-
subsidized HSAs, will be the magic bullet that slows the rate of health care 
cost increases in the country.  HDHPs and HSAs could give consumers strong 
financial incentives to exercise “individual responsibility” for their health care 
choices through choosing less expensive providers and avoiding unnecessary 
 
 19. 60 Minutes: Is the Price Right? (CBS television broadcast Mar. 5, 2006). 
 20. See Pricing Practices of Hospitals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 13–14 (2004) (statement of Nancy M. Kane, DBA, 
Harvard Sch. of Pub. Health). 
 21. See MEDPAC REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SELECTED MEDICARE ISSUES, 186 tbl. C-12 
(June 2000) (classifying bad debtors under the “uncompensated care” payer category). 
 22. Editorial, supra note 11. 
 23. Hugh F. Daly III et al., Into the Red to Stay in the Pink: The Hidden Cost of Being 
Uninsured, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 39, 43, 58–59 (2002). 
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care.  However, excessive hospital prices charged to the self-paying patient 
present a major obstacle to the realization of effective consumer purchasing. 
This latter group may be the political force behind congressional pressures 
on the Office of the Inspector General to adopt as a final regulation a 2003 
proposed rule that defines “excessive prices” to Medicare.  The proposed rule 
suggests that hospital prices be considered excessive if they are greater than 
120% of average net payments of all private sector payers, excluding charity 
discounts and capitated payments.24  Such a rule, if implemented, would 
threaten hospitals with exclusion from participating in the Medicare program if 
they submitted claims found to contain excessive charges.  Since hospitals are 
not allowed to have different charge-masters for different patient-payer classes 
(discriminatory pricing), prices would have to be adjusted for all patients, 
including direct-pay patients to a level compliant with the 120% rule.  With 
private sector discounts averaging roughly 50% of charges, such a rule could 
lower charges to self-paying patients by roughly 40% off current levels.  
Perhaps even more important, Medicare would be brought into the pricing 
battle as both a directly affected party (some Medicare payments are 
influenced by hospital charges) as well as potentially becoming the regulatory 
and administrative vehicle that collects hospital charges and private sector 
discounts, investigates them for reasonableness, and makes that data available 
to the public. 
B. Excessive Personal Gain 
This concern, too, is multifaceted.  Most visible is the level of executive 
compensation that hospital boards approve.  According to one source, 
nonprofit executive salaries have grown by 20 to 30% per year over the past 
five years (2000–2005), far exceeding the pay raises of other workers.25  
Health system executives earning over a million dollars in annual salary and 
retiring with $5 to $6 million “golden handshakes” at a time when low-wage 
hospital employees have to enroll their children in Medicaid catches the 
attention of policymakers and the I.R.S.  In 2005, the I.R.S. Commissioner, 
Mark Everson, announced a crackdown on excessive compensation within tax-
exempt organizations, and Senator Grassley included detailed questions about 
executive compensation and benefits in his letters to ten hospitals requesting 
information about what makes them charitable.26 
 
 24. Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of Terms 
and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive 
Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939, 53,942 (Sept. 15, 2003). 
 25. Joe Rojas-Burke, Scrutiny Rises with Hospital Paychecks, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 22, 
2005, at A1. 
 26. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 5. 
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Besides executives, policymakers are concerned about hospital-physician 
joint ventures in which the hospital may provide the capital and/or share the 
operating risk with physician owners of profitable freestanding services in 
imaging, laboratory, day surgery, and specialty inpatient care.  Such ventures 
are often driven by physicians seeking to enhance their income, which has 
declined in real dollars in recent years as the payment environment has 
tightened.27  One of Senator Grassley’s questions that hospitals were asked to 
respond to included whether they agreed that “[m]any nonprofit, tax-exempt 
hospitals engage in joint ventures that shift the most profitable and valuable 
procedures, practices, and income streams to the joint ventures so that the 
greater profits and value may be shared with physicians and other for-profit 
persons.”28 
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas expressed 
concern that hospitals have become “increasingly commercial” in their 
operations.29  Hospitals have diversified into many businesses in the last 
twenty years, from health insurance and physician practices to assisted living 
facilities, software companies, and even venture funds investing in the 
commercialization of medical discoveries.  Many of these business ventures 
are for-profit, owned solely by the health system or in partnership with a for-
profit organization.  Some turn out to be expensive business failures financed 
by charitable dollars.30  The magnitude of investment and return are very 
difficult to detect as multiple entities are involved, only some of which must 
file a 990 tax return with the I.R.S.  Over ten years ago, this movement into 
commercial operations was recognized by some as likely to negatively impact 
the social mission of hospitals.  In January 1995, Cardinal Joseph Bernadin 
was quoted as saying, “I am becoming increasingly concerned that our 
healthcare delivery system is rapidly commercializing itself, and in the process 
is abandoning core values that should always be at the heart of healthcare.”31  
Ten years later, growing controversy over hospital tax-exemption reflects 
society’s recognition that, indeed, commercialization and charity are often 
incompatible core values. 
 
 27. Ha T. Tu & Paul B. Ginsburg, Losing Ground: Physician Income, 1995–2003, 
TRACKING REP. 15 (Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change), June 2006, at 1. 
 28. Savage, supra note 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Lawton R. Burns et al., The Financial Performance of Integrated Health 
Organizations, J. OF HEALTHCARE MGMT 191, 206 (May–June 2005). 
 31. David W. Johnson, Managing Director, Citigroup, Presentation at Harvard School of 
Public Health, Financing the Future: Healthcare Trends and Their Impact on Capital Funding 
(Mar. 18, 2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS 465 
C. Demonstrable Value for Tax Exemption 
In 2005, in response to a request by the House Ways and Means 
Committee, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a report 
on differences found in the provision of uncompensated care (bad debt and free 
care combined) among private nonprofit, publicly-owned, and investor-owned 
hospitals.32  They concluded that government hospitals maintained 
significantly higher uncompensated care burdens (defined as the ratio of 
uncompensated care relative to total operating expense) than the other groups, 
while nonprofit private and investor-owned hospitals showed only small 
differences in uncompensated care burden.33  Furthermore, only a very small 
proportion of hospitals provided the bulk of the private nonprofit 
uncompensated care burden.34  The GAO commented that 
current tax policy lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for 
charitable entities . . . .  If these criteria are articulated in accordance with 
desired goals, standards could be established that would allow nonprofit 
hospitals to be held accountable for providing services of benefit to the public 
commensurate with their favored tax status.35 
Studies comparing the value of tax exemptions to the provision of charity 
care have found that most hospitals would not earn their tax exemption on the 
value of charity care alone, particularly when charity care is expressed in terms 
of costs, not charges.36  Hospitals argue that they provide many community 
benefits other than charity care, and that these benefits should be considered 
when comparing value for tax exemption.  However, even within the hospital 
industry there is disagreement as to which activities should justify tax 
exemption.  Currently, for instance, the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
disagrees with the Catholic Healthcare Association (CHA) over whether bad 
debt expense and “Medicare shortfalls” (excess of cost over payment) should 
be considered community benefits, with the AHA asserting that they should be 
 
 32. DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, NONPROFIT, FOR-PROFIT, AND GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS: 
UNCOMPENSATED CARE AND OTHER COMMUNITY BENEFITS (May 2005). 
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 19. 
 36. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY 
BENEFITS (Dec. 2006); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: BETTER STANDARDS 
NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTION (May 1990); HEATHER O’DONNEL & RALPH MARTIRE, CTR. FOR 
TAX AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE TAX EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO 
COOK COUNTY NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE CHARITY CARE PROVIDED IN RETURN (2006); 
Nancy M. Kane & William H. Wubbenhorst, Alternative Funding Policies for the Uninsured: 
Exploring the Value of Hospital Tax Exemption, 78 MILBANK Q. 185, 199 (2000). 
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considered and the CHA saying they should not.37  The GAO study discussed 
earlier noted that hospitals reported a wide range of other community benefits, 
but that there was no clear pattern distinguishing nonprofit from investor-
owned hospital groups.38  Furthermore, there was no independent audit or 
meaningful monitoring of the data reported to states, and states that required 
community benefit reporting were not routinely using the data to review 
hospital tax status.39  The Commissioner of the I.R.S., Mark Everson, was 
quoted as saying that agents “often found little difference between nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals ‘in their operations, their attention to the benefit of the 
community, or their levels of charity care.’”40 
Besides questioning the value of charity care and other community benefits 
relative to the value of tax exemption, federal policymakers are exploring the 
distribution and use of tax-exempt bonds when hospitals could have used 
internal assets to meet their capital investment needs.  Termed “tax arbitrage,” 
some large nonprofit hospital systems borrow using tax-exempt bonds even 
though they have investment assets (unrestricted marketable securities that 
were earned through unrestricted gifts, investment income, retained earnings, 
and funded depreciation) that could cover some or all of the cost of needed 
capital projects.  Hospitals engage in tax arbitrage when the tax-subsidized cost 
of borrowing is below the returns they can earn on investment assets.  As one 
hospital system noted in its 1999 Bond Prospectus: “Management has taken a 
pro-active approach to managing the debt position and the investment portfolio 
for the System.  The overall weighted average interest rate on long-term debt is 
5.50%, while the overall investment portfolio has generated an average annual 
return in excess of 14%.”41 
One study found that over half the tax-exempt debt held by hospitals in 
1996 could have been eliminated if hospitals had used their “endowment 
assets” before borrowing.42  The same study also found that both endowment 
assets and tax-exempt bonds are concentrated in a minority of hospitals, 
indicating that tax subsidies are benefiting cash-rich hospitals while not 
helping those cash-poor hospitals most in need of outside financing.43  
Congress and the I.R.S. are now looking into whether this is an appropriate use 
of tax-exempt bonds, which represent a significant “tax expenditure” of the 
 
 37. David Burda, Stop Playing Politics with Charity, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 5, 2006, at 
20. 
 38. WALKER, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
 39. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 36, at 20. 
 40. Pear, supra note 13. 
 41. Official Statement for Revenue Bonds, Series 1999 A, UPMC Health System, A-15. 
 42. William M. Gentry, Debt, Investment, and Endowment Accumulation: The Case of Not-
for-Profit Hospitals, 21 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 845, 871 (2002). 
 43. Id. at 870. 
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federal government.44  With over $100 billion in tax-exempt debt outstanding 
as of 2002, the possibility that half was used for tax arbitrage rather than for 
expanding access to capital for cash-strapped hospitals could generate even 
more taxpayer indignation.45 
A final area of broad inquiry into the value of tax exemption comes from 
the local level, where property tax exemption requests by hospitals are 
increasingly meeting resistance by local tax authorities.  In 2005, the Fiscal 
Research staff of the North Carolina General Legislature noted that tax-exempt 
hospitals represent as much as 2% of total county property value in the state, 
and that the percentage was growing as hospitals acquired medical office 
buildings and residential real estate.46  This finding prompted proposed Senate 
Bill 175, which would require that rental housing, physician offices off 
hospital grounds, and health clubs and child care facilities open to the public 
be subject to county property taxes.47  New Hampshire’s General Legislature 
appointed a committee to “study the exemption from property taxes for not-
for-profit hospitals.”48  Among its conclusions was that hospital acquisitions of 
doctors’ clinics and offices had “defeated the legislative intent of broadening 
the business tax base,” referring to the Business Enterprise Tax, enacted in 
1993.49 
In more substantive action, the Ohio Tax Commissioner recently ruled 
against Cleveland Clinic’s request to extend its tax exemption to an acquired 
family health and surgery center in a wealthy suburb.50  Here, the Beachwood 
school district contested the request, claiming that the clinic itself provided 
little to no charity.51  While the Cleveland Clinic appeals that ruling, certain 
Cleveland-area school districts are challenging the tax-exempt status of other 
Cleveland Clinic properties, worth an expected $17 million for the Clinic and 
its system as a whole.52 
In all of these property tax challenges and investigations, the amount of 
charity provided was considered as part of the expected value that localities 
considered.  As the North Carolina legislature and others have discovered, the 
value of charity care provided varies considerably within a geographically-
defined group of nonprofit hospitals, as well as within facility members of a 
 
 44. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND TAX ARBITRAGE (Dec. 
2006). 
 45. The amount of tax-exempt financing outstanding in 2002 was between $94 billion and 
$124 billion.  Email from Dennis Zimmerman, CBO Analyst (Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with author). 
 46. Horton, supra note 12. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Talbot, supra note 8. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Treffinger, supra note 10. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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hospital system.  The New Hampshire committee report pointed out that 
historically, charity was “the reason that led the legislature to grant these 
hospitals tax exemption.”53  However, all parties to these studies point out that 
the charity standard is not well articulated and is insufficient for today’s health 
care system. 
D. Transparency 
The lack of transparency of hospital activities adds fuel to the fire of public 
ire and policymakers’ distrust.  Inadequate public reporting of charity care and 
community benefits is common.  This is apparently a problem across the 
nonprofit sector.  One of the major recommendations of the Panel on the 
Nonprofit Sector’s June 2005 Report to Congress is that “[i]nformation about 
the organization’s charitable purpose and key program achievements should be 
included on the first pages of the Forms.”54  Part of that can be changed by 
policymakers themselves; neither the I.R.S. Form 990 nor the Medicare Cost 
Report, the only two national sources of mandatory public reporting by 
nonprofit hospitals, has a standard definition of charity care or a fixed place to 
report it in their forms.  Unfortunately, a recent attempt by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services to require uncompensated care information 
(the new Schedule 10) suffers from ambiguous reporting instructions, 
rendering the 2004 reported results unusable.55 
Meanwhile, the Catholic Healthcare Association, the Voluntary Hospital 
Association, the American Hospital Association, and others have attempted to 
standardize reporting for community benefits—both charity and other types of 
activities—but the standards are voluntary and vary with the source.  A 
significant area of disagreement is how to count bad debts, as well as the 
“Medicare shortfall.”  State efforts to define a standard for community benefit 
have been undermined at times by industry insistence that the broadest possible 
definition be used, thus rendering a standard or requirement meaningless.56 
Not only do many hospitals fail to inform the public and tax authorities of 
their charitable activities, but they also fail to inform their patients of charity 
care eligibility and availability policies.  One of the most egregious allegations 
against Yale-New Haven Hospital, described in a 2003 report authored by a 
staff researcher of the Service Employees International Union, was that the 
 
 53. Talbot, supra note 8. 
 54. PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 27 (June 2005). 
 55. See Jack Ashby & Craig Lisk, Presentation before the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, Public Meeting, 176, 183–85 (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.medpac.gov/ 
public_meetings/transcripts/1108_1109_medpac.final.pdf. 
 56. For instance, see the Utah community benefit standard as described in Alice A. Noble, 
Andrew L. Hyams & Nancy M. Kane, Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis of 
Legal and Policy Initiatives,  J. L. MED. & ETHICS, Spring 1998, at 116, 121. 
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hospital had a large, donor-restricted fund dedicated to providing free care to 
qualified patients, yet the hospital chose instead to pursue indigent patients as 
bad debtors.57  Many indigent patients never knew of the existence of charity 
funds.  As one dunned uninsured former patient said, “I asked Yale-New 
Haven’s triage and billing staff if the Hospital had charity care.  They said no.  
The doctors and nurses all said they didn’t know anything.”58  Meanwhile from 
1996 to 2001, the free care fund more than doubled in value, while free care 
provision decreased by 46% and bad debt expense rose by 50%.59 
Finally, pricing transparency remains a major problem for hospitals and for 
those who want consumers to become more effective purchasers of care.  
While it is difficult if not impossible to know in advance every service and 
procedure that a patient might receive for a given condition, it is possible to put 
the combined average prices of the bundle of services required for common 
treatments and procedures such as normal deliveries, standard radiology exams 
and lab tests, or a trip to the emergency room on a public web site.  Some 
states have passed legislation recently requiring public disclosure of prices of 
common inpatient and outpatient services or procedures. 
E. Accountability 
The United States is unique among industrialized nations in its reliance 
upon private nonprofit charitable hospitals competing for resources in a 
market-oriented, fragmented payment environment.  Other countries have 
independent nonprofit hospitals but these institutions generally must be 
accountable to a public authority that controls the funds, such as a provincial or 
national health authority whose primary responsibility is the health of a 
geographic area.  Also, most wealthy industrialized nations do not have 
millions of uninsured people.  In the U.S., no public entity is responsible for 
the health of a geographic area; instead, geographic areas are viewed as 
“markets” within which hospitals compete for paying patients and try to keep 
the nonpaying patients from putting them at a serious competitive 
disadvantage.  The private nonprofit hospital in the U.S. is also uniquely 
dependent upon private markets for capital financing, which further raises the 
pressure on hospitals to be driven by economic concerns. 
Accountability for the charitable behavior of a nonprofit private hospital in 
the U.S. rests officially with its board, which is a self-perpetuating group of 
citizens often chosen for their role as donors, rather than as overseers of the 
hospital’s charitable mission.  Even highly conscientious board members find 
it challenging to understand the complexities of modern hospital enterprise, 
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and CEOs do not always fully inform their boards about sensitive issues such 
as how self-pay patients are billed or even about the details of executive 
compensation. 
Egregious malfeasance may be challenged by the state attorney general, 
but this is rare because most state attorneys general have many competing 
interests as well as very limited resources with which to monitor nonprofit 
hospital behavior.  The I.R.S. receives Form 990 filings from hospitals every 
year, but it lacks the resources to even review the forms, much less determine 
whether or not the content is valid or the reported activities appropriate.  From 
1996 through 2001, staffing for the tax-exempt division of the I.R.S. fell by 
15%, while the number of Form 900s filed by charities increased by 25%.60  
The Form 990 examination rate for all charities was less than 1% over that 
period.61  Even with more resources and reviews, the information in the Form 
990 does not allow the I.R.S. to determine whether or not a hospital is fulfilling 
its charitable mission.  While the I.R.S. is now stepping up its efforts to review 
and investigate nonprofit hospitals and other tax-exempt entities with respect 
to whether or not their charitable status is merited, it still lacks a clear standard 
by which to make that judgment. 
Our unique system of hospital accountability provides the greatest level of 
institutional discretion, thus fostering innovation and responsiveness to local 
opportunity.  However, it has a negative side, which includes resistance to 
external accountability and the potential for excessive responsiveness to 
economic incentives to the detriment of charitable responsibilities. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Much of the public uproar about hospitals’ behavior with respect to their 
charitable obligations is not about illegal behavior, but about behavior that falls 
below broadly held social expectations of charitable hospitals and health 
systems.  As a judge ruling on one of the class action lawsuits over hospital 
charity care and billing practices wrote, “[P]laintiffs have come to the judicial 
branch for relief that may only be granted by the legislative branch.”62  It is 
likely that laws will be passed that better reflect these emerging social 
expectations. 
The range of federal policy options goes from simply revoking tax-exempt 
status to setting a higher and more articulated standard for tax-exemption that 
addresses at least some of the five broad issues described here. 
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The option of simply revoking tax-exempt status for hospitals has a 
number of critical drawbacks.  One is that it punishes a whole industry, 
including the many hospitals that have responsibly balanced their charitable 
mission with their financial requirements and have maintained a high degree of 
transparency and accountability to their communities.  Another drawback is 
that the value lost to hospitals would greatly exceed the gain in federal tax 
revenues, as federal tax-exempt status is required for hospitals to receive most 
grants and donations and qualifies hospitals for state and local exemptions and 
tax-exempt debt.  Perhaps most important, charitable nonprofit status is still 
associated with community trust, an intangible asset with enormous value in 
many markets. 
Loss of tax exemption would push nonprofit hospitals into joining the 
investor-owned for-profit sector—a group that profits from cherry-picking 
locations and services.63  Investor-owned hospitals have also been particularly 
adept at exploiting loopholes in complex tax and payment systems, 
experiencing regular cycles of litigation and settlement costs over such 
activities as fraudulent Medicare billing and reporting practices, inappropriate 
medical care, and I.R.S. tax challenges. 
Far better would be for Congress to define a higher standard for federal tax 
exemption, one which articulates meaningful behavioral expectations of tax-
exempt hospitals.  These could include: 
 Requiring that eligibility for charity or discounted care be tied to the 
magnitude of the self-pay portion of the bill relative to the patient’s 
financial resources, regardless of patient insurance status.  The I.R.S. 
would regularly review this policy for reasonableness and require that it be 
provided on a standardized disclosure form attached to the I.R.S. Form 
990 and on the hospital’s web site.  While this could encourage some 
people to not buy health insurance or to buy high-deductible plans without 
HSAs,64 it is already the case that self-paying people expect (and take) 
“discounts” when they cannot pay the bill.  There is some evidence that if 
the bill is set at a level that they can reasonably be expected to pay, 
patients are more likely to pay it.65 
 Requiring that hospitals and related health service-providing entities 
ensure that patients are aware of the availability of charity care and 
discounted care.  Part of the requirement would be a regular monitoring of 
the level of awareness in the community of the hospital’s charity care and 
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discounted care policies, particularly among the most vulnerable 
populations. 
 Requiring that hospitals justify to the I.R.S. their debt collection practices 
(and those of their agents) in terms of methods used and collection rates 
(amounts collected relative to amounts owed) over a rolling five-year 
period.  The I.R.S. would regularly review these reports to ensure that 
hospitals and their agents are not using aggressive debt collection practices 
primarily to discourage access to health services (for example, very low 
collection rates associated with highly aggressive collection tactics). 
 Requiring that hospitals partner with community groups and agencies to 
improve access to care for vulnerable populations in their service area, 
with regular reports to both the I.R.S. and the hospital or system board. 
 Requiring that hospitals produce a community benefit report as an 
attachment to the I.R.S. Form 990 and available on the hospitals’ web sites 
that is compliant with the voluntary reporting guidelines established by the 
Catholic Healthcare Association and its collaborators.  Any deviance from 
the guidelines should be highlighted and the impact noted (e.g., inclusion 
of bad debt or Medicare shortfalls should be separately identified if 
reported at all). 
 Requiring that hospital boards maintain a permanent “tax-exempt 
compliance” committee responsible for review, monitoring, and reporting 
on charity care policies and provision, other community benefits, 
collection policies, executive compensation, and joint venture 
arrangements, as well as the transparent reporting of such activities to the 
public and the I.R.S.  The committee should regularly review hospital bad 
debt collection practices and collection rates and develop means of 
assessing billing and collection impact on the health of patients who owe 
money or are uninsured in the community. 
These guidelines would not be onerous for the many hospitals seeking to 
behave appropriately.  However, they would set forth more clearly than does 
current law what behaviors are expected of our charitable hospitals.  These do 
not address some of the issues under debate today, such as pricing transparency 
for individual purchasers or how to deal with the use of tax-exempt financing 
proceeds if “tax arbitrage” is not consistent with congressional goals for 
subsidizing hospital debt.  These activities may best be addressed separately 
from the general issue of a standard for charitable tax exemption, as they are 
amenable to adjustments in regulations already governing Medicare 
participation and eligibility for tax-exempt financing. 
Some might argue that defining a higher standard of behavior for 
charitable tax-exempt status gives for-profit hospitals a competitive advantage 
over exempt hospitals or might encourage some exempt hospitals to convert to 
for-profit status rather than comply with the standard.  However, this ignores 
the fact that in today’s environment, having no effective charitable standard 
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has resulted in a relatively small number of nonprofit hospitals shouldering the 
bulk of the charitable burden for vulnerable communities.  This puts them at a 
huge disadvantage relative to their nonprofit competitors who fail to 
acknowledge such charitable obligations.  It is time to level the charitable 
playing field with an enforceable and clear charitable standard reflective of 
society’s expectations. 
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